be consciously aware of the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. Further, each field poses its own particular problems which are dealt with individually as a result of the great variety of articles. The caliber of the contributors combines with the importance of the subject to make this book a significant contribution to the general study of religion. 19, 29, 30, 85, 110 ). In the latter category, there are assertions that would require an elaborate argument in order to appear plausible. In the absence of such arguments, many would say that these assertions are simply careless or mistaken. Finally, there are systematic shortcomings. One fundamental claim and intent of the Critique is quite disregarded. It is Kant's attempt to go beyond the philosophical concern with things and problems to the conditions of the possibility of things and problems. This is the transcendental step that Kant takes. Nikam explicitly identifies "transcendental" with "a priori" (pp. 4-5), whereas Kant, being notoriously lax with terms though nonetheless rigorous in his thinking, incidentally uses these terms as synonyms. Nikam's identification quite consistently leads to an interpretation of the transcendental deduction as the establishing of a hypothesis that explains the facts of knowledge, a hypothesis that can be checked against these facts (pp. 46-47). But what Kant wanted to show was that the categories (Nikam's "antecedent conditions") are fundamentally and necessarily constitutive of every fact so that without and prior to the categories we have no access to facts nor to a method of verification in Nikam's sense. Kant's enterprise might be inherently impossible, but that would have had to be argued explicitly. Apart
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